'We now have an historic opportunity to review our policies on agriculture, on land use, on biodiversity on woodlands, on marine conservation….we need to take the opportunity that being outside the common agricultural policy will give us to reward environmentally responsible land use.…..The Common Agricultural Policy rewards size of land-holding ahead of good environmental practice, and all too often puts resources in the hands of the already wealthy rather than into the common good of our shared natural environment. It also encourages patterns of land use which are wasteful of natural resources and often intrinsically poor value rather than encouraging imaginative and environmentally enriching alternatives'. 3
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the principle of 'public money for public goods'. The implications of this change in direction are far reaching and multi-faceted. It is also closely connected and complementary to the policies outlined in the 25-year Environment Plan published by HM government earlier in 2018. 5 Before we consider these in more detail, it will be necessary to first consider the way in which public support for agriculture is currently organised within the CAP.
Farm Support under the CAP
Although public financial support for the agriculture sector has declined in relative terms, spending on the CAP in the UK still stands at over £3 Billion annually. Direct payments to farmers are delivered separately under the two 'Pillars' of the CAP. Pillar 1 channels direct payments to farmers within the 'basic payment scheme', while Pillar 2 funds rural development measures, including the financing of the agri-environment schemes ('AES') under the England Rural Development Plan, and the rural development plans for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland e.g. Countryside Stewardship in England and Glastir in Wales. Expenditure under Pillar 1 is fully financed from the EU budget, whereas expenditure under Pillar 2 is, in almost all cases, dependent upon co-financing by Member States. In 2017 direct payments under Pillar 1 in the UK actually rose by 2.4% to £2.719 billion; payments under Pillar 2 for agri-environment measures fell slightly to £423 million. 6 In total, in 2017 £3.25 billion was paid to UK farmers and landowners under the various CAP support arrangements. 7 The policy design of CAP support is itself contentious. Critics argue that is essentially a public subsidy for the private production of a private good -food, for which the public pays twice (as tax payers and again as food purchasers). 8 And because Pillar 1 payments are paid on a per hectare basis, the majority of public financial support goes to a minority of large landowners: it is estimated that half of direct aid beneficiaries receive less than 1250 Euros a year, while 2% of beneficiaries each receive more than 50,000 Euros annually -over 30% of the total direct payments envelope. 9 Its environmental impacts have also been well rehearsed. Two recent French studies have, for example, highlighted the loss of 30% of French farmland bird populations over the last 15years, mainly as a result of increased pesticide use. 10 Farmland bird populations in the UK have also seen substantial declines, with spectacular collapses in the breeding populations of some iconic bird species, such as corn bunting. 11 A recent study by the Wildlife Trusts, RSPB and the National Trust estimated that the financial needs for environmental land management post-Brexit would require an annual investment of at least £2.3 billion p.a. 12 This means, in effect, that when we leave the CAP, the funds currently disbursed under Pillar 2 of CAP will need to be replaced by a much larger environmental 'envelope' -into which much of the 'saving' from the cessation of Pillar 1 payments will need to be put if post-Brexit agricultural policy is to deliver the environmental benefits that Brexit could offer.
If we are to develop an environmental policy tailored to the specific needs of the British countryside, free from the constraints of the CAP, this will require both vision and innovation in developing new and ambitious approaches to environmental land management. It will also be expensive. But Brexit does give us the opportunity to develop a new approach to the 'farmed' environment, tailored to the specific needs of the wildlife and habitats found in the British countryside, and to start to remedy some of the environmental harm cause by the intensive farming practices formerly encouraged by the CAP. The key questions are: how should a new environmental land management programme be designed, and how should it be targeted? And, of course, how and to what extent will it be resourced? The most important change posited by the Health and Harmony policy statement is the proposal to base future agricultural support on the principle of 'public money for public goods' -with the protection and enhancement of the environment being considered 'the pre-eminent public good'. 13 The policy statement suggested that a new environmental land management scheme will be developed to deliver the outcomes of the 25 Year Environment Plan and the Clean Growth Strategy. 14 Freed from the constraints of working within the legal framework of the CAP, this will be able to develop innovative approaches to environmental stewardship.
The Agriculture Bill
The first step in this direction came with the introduction of the Agriculture Bill into the House of Commons in September 2018. Important questions remain unanswered, however. There is no definition of 'public goods' in the Bill itselfwhat will the new approach encompass? How will support for environmental land management be paid for? How will the use of public money for environmental protection be evaluated (on a payment by results basis for example?)? And what legal instruments will be needed to underpin new and innovative ways of managing the natural environment? None of these 'big' questions are addressed in the Agriculture Bill. This will be an enabling Act, giving DEFRA wide administrative powers to oversee and administer grant schemes and the monitoring and management of public support to farmers, landowners and others. But it lacks clarity on a range of key issues, including the balance that will be sought between promoting food production and environmental protection, and how the 'pubic goods' to be provided by the new policy will be prioritised for financial support. 15 It also establishes an 'agricultural transition period' for England, which will run for seven years starting with 2021, and during which the Secretary of State will have power to make regulations modifying aspects of the EU direct payments and rural development regimes insofar as their application continues. 16 Whether the vision becomes a reality will depend upon the design and delivery of the new land management scheme -which remains a work in progress.
If we consider the prospects for future environmental land management, the most important new power in the Bill 17 is one enabling DEFRA to give financial assistance for managing land or water: 'in a way that protects or improves the environment', cultural or natural heritage; that supports public 13 Health and Harmony op.cit at page 32. 14 Health and Harmony op.cit. at page 36. 15 The lack of clarity in the Agriculture Bill on key issues such as these has been criticized by access to the countryside; supports mitigation or adaptation to climate change; that prevents, reduces or protects from environmental hazards; that protects or improves the health of livestock; and/or that protects or improves the health of plants. This is a wide-ranging empowerment clause; one that would facilitate the future provision of financial support not only for agrienvironmental schemes that pay farmers for land management to protect and recreate sensitive habitats and landscapes, but also for measures to promote (for example) the creation and management of 'green space' for open pubic access, climate change focussed actions, and measures to promote animal welfare. The potential range of recipients under the new financial subvention power is not limited to farmers. It can be used to make payments for environmental services provided by a wide range of actors -including for example NGOs, landowners, and those (for example the water utilities) purchasing ecosystem services from land managers. This represents a change from the previous powers that applied under CAP, where payment was restricted to 'active farmers', and the enabling legislation set out a complex legal definition to establish a claimant's qualification to receive payment. 18 The breadth of the enabling powers in the Bill is important. In particular, it will facilitate the provision of wider public financial support for multi partner arrangements to provide ecosystem services. Consider for example the provision of 'slow clean water' -an important ecosystem benefit that can be delivered through the careful management of large upland areas within a water catchment. Sympathetic land management would be of considerable value to a water utility taking water from the catchment for drinking water supply; it could reduce nitrate and fertiliser levels in the water entering its water treatment works and reduce rates of flow in rivers and streams feeding water supply works, both of which would reduce the utility's operating costs when providing potable water for public supply. The wide powers in the Bill could be used to give financial support for multi-party agreements between farmers, landowners, water companies, sporting groups (for example grouse moor managers) and others with an interest in the use of upland areas within the water catchment. This is a significant shift in emphasis and direction for environmental land management schemes and their public funding model. This type of arrangement does not currently map neatly onto the legal arrangements for public support under Pillar 2 of the CAP, where payments are limited to an 'active farmer'. Any subsidy paid to farmers for land management in a water catchment are currently paid directly to them under agri-environment schemes, such as Countryside Stewardship, funded through the England Rural Development Plan by taxation and co-financing from the EU. 19 There is no provision for funding non-farmer actors (such as the utilities in the example given above) in this funding model.
Payment for Ecosystem Services ("PES")
The Health and Harmony policy proposals could signal a shift to modelling future agricultural support on payment for the ecosystem services supplied by land managers. 20 
There is no direct link in areabased payments, however, between a 'seller' of ecosystem services and a 'buyer' or 'user' of such services.
A move to PES as the basis for future agricultural support would require us to put a value ('price') on ecosystem services, which could then be purchased by end users -and these could include private actors (for example the water utilities) as well as the public at large. It would, in other words, be premised on linking land managers as 'suppliers' of the service with end-users or purchasers. 21 This would enable us to introduce private purchase by third parties into the equation, as well as funding some ecosystem services of wider societal benefit through 'purchase' at public expense. The latter might include the protection of sensitive natural habitats or landscapes and providing new opportunities for public access to privately owned land (which will also provide health benefits though pubic access to 'green space'). A welldesigned PES scheme could, therefore, have a blended mixture of private and public funding delivering multiple benefits. 22 There are, however, 19 The Catchment Sensitive Farming scheme, for example, offers a partnership approach between Defra, the Environment Agency, Natural England and farmers in high priority catchment areas. The scheme is underpinned by financial support delivered through the Countryside Stewardship AES. challenges to replacing direct, area-based payments with PES schemes that link public money to the provision of public goods.
One criticism of the current system based no area-based payments is the uncertainty of the future benefit they deliver -how can we justify payment if a public 'good' has not actually been delivered in return for payment? Another problem associated with the current approach, which is based on management agreements as the legal medium for 'wrapping' subsidy payments in appropriate land management obligations, 23 is that at the end of the contract the property rights exchanged in the agreement will revert to the landowner. This means that any environmental benefit developed at public expense during the agreement is not 'locked in' or preserved -the land manager is free to manage the land in future as s/he wishes, even if this destroys or diminishes the environmental improvements previously 'purchased' at cost under the agreement. 24 At first sight payment by results might be a better option for delivering PES. But while this may appear to be a cost-effective way of delivering value for money for taxpayers, directly linking payments to outcomes ("payment by results") can be problematic. For example, schemes are costly to monitor, farmers may be exposed to unnecessary risk if a natural disaster prevents them from meeting agreed outcome, or well-organised NGOs and large landowners could out-compete small individual farmers when competing for payments to deliver a public good. 25 It does not seem unreasonable for the risk to be shared between the farmer and the taxpayer if a PES scheme is to incentivise farmers and landowners to participate. 26 Research funded by the Valuing Nature Programme, drawing on experience in the Welsh Rural Development Programme, has proposed three key changes to agricultural payments that could overcome some of the problems inherent in developing PES schemes. Firstly, we should pay for the ecosystem services that are valued most by society based on economics research into public preferences for different services in different parts of the UK. Secondly, payments should be targeted to locations where ecosystem services can most efficiently be provided, based on evidence from land use modelling, using random sampling within land classes to validate model outputs in place of more widespread farm inspections. Finally, we should provide incentives for cross-boundary collaboration over the provision of ecosystem services that need to be managed at catchment or wider spatial scales. Land managers could, for example, be given a menu of environmental benefits to choose from, with the menu differing between areas, depending on the public preferences, 27 and which benefits can most cost-effectively be provided in any given location. Existing process-based models using combined high-resolution remote sensing imagery can identify locations where there are opportunities to provide key benefits in the most costeffective way. 28 In this way, spending is prioritized (by increasing scheme points available) to the locations that can most easily provide the benefits that society wants, and land managers in those locations are paid for the work they do on a stable, ongoing basis. It is important to note that there would be both winners and losers if those managing certain areas are paid more or less, based on the different levels of benefits they are able to provide society.
An alternative option would supplement public funding for the provision of environmental benefits with private funding via PES Services schemes; successful examples here include the Woodland Carbon Code 29 and the Peatland Code. 30 Place-based schemes have the potential to integrate payments for multiple services and habitats to provide payments at higher levels over longer periods than are currently available for similar work under the EU funding. 31 Landscape Enterprise Networks (LENs) were highlighted in the 25 year environment plan as an example of this approach, integrating funding from private beneficiaries to deliver benefits for the environment, farmers and businesses. 32 pricing models based on payments for ecosystem services, thereby potentially generating additional income for farmers while enhancing food security. 33 Other models have been suggested, including the Natural Infrastructure Scheme (NIS) proposed by the National Trust and Green Alliance. 34 This would bring together public and private actors in a PES based framework to develop environmentally beneficial land management. The National Infrastructure Scheme explores options for setting the price for ecosystem services on the basis of the avoided cost delivered to the 'purchaser'. The model is a variation on the PES 'payment range' model that has been suggested as a best practice option by government. 35 It would cover net profits foregone by the provider (e.g. a farmer) in changing his/her land management so as to provide the service, and the upper ceiling would be variable, and represent the external benefits of the ecosystem provided. In the case of wetlands management, for example, this could be flood risk management, water quality management or habitat protection, as the case may be. Using an 'avoided cost' basis for the payment calculation would allow PES to capture the costs saving to (for example) a water utility of 'slow clean water' provided through changes in catchment land management by farmers, in agreement with the 'purchaser' utility. The scheme would provide a means to bring groups of land managers together to sell environmental services to groups of beneficiaries, facilitated by a new area-based market in avoided costs. 36
Creating a Market for Ecosystem Services: Legal Issues
Implementing an ambitious programme involving any, or a combination, of the above would require the development of a new legal model to underpin the creation of a new market for the provision of ecosystem services. This will need to be sufficiently flexible and robust to accommodate four objectives: (i) the combination of public and (ii) private funding inputs, combined with (iii) long term horizons for environmental planning by landscape managers, and also (iv) provide a legal basis for collaborative implementation at a landscape scale.
(a) A Stable Property Rights Framework
Long term planning and implementation requires a stable long-term tenure structure within which the ecosystem 'provider' can develop land management systems to deliver the public goods incentivised by the chosen scheme model -whether it be the publicly funded provision of ecosystem services using one of the models above, or the provision of environmental benefits with mixed or private funding, such as the National Infrastructure Scheme or the Peatlands Code.
Viewed through the lens of agricultural economics, schemes based on PES create new property rights in ecosystem service provision designed to internalise environmental costs. The allocation of these new rights depends, of course, on the pre-existing distribution of property rights and the institutional framework on which those rights rest. 37 It is important that public agencies can direct payments to the right 'providers', and if there is a lack of clarity in the allocation of property rights -of who can access and manage the land which is to me managed so as to deliver the ecosystem services in question -then this may provide the conditions for elites to appropriate traditional access rights. 38 The tenurial basis by which ecosystem providers hold land is therefore of direct relevance to the development of robust PES schemes in practice.
In England and Wales, a large proportion of agricultural land will be held by land managers under one of two forms of tenancy structure: either as an agricultural holding 39 or a farm business tenancy ('FBT'). 40 Agricultural Holdings enjoy extensive security, giving the farm tenant lifetime security of tenure with (in some cases) two generation succession rights. A substantial area of land is still held under this category of full agricultural tenancy -in 2016, 1,407,000 hectares of farmland in England was held as agricultural holdings. 41 In England and Wales as a whole this approximates to 17% of the total area of farmed land. 42 In contrast, an FBT is a more flexible form of land tenure, but offers little security of tenure beyond the contractually agreed period of the tenancy. 43 Most FBTs are of short duration, although some institutional landowners use longer term FBTs e.g. for a fixed period of ten years. In 2016 1,193,000 hectares of land was held under FBTs. 44 The use of FBTs will often be inappropriate to meet the needs of a PES scheme, as they create an insecure form of property right in the 'provider'. Most FBTs are currently short term, and of approximately 4 years duration. 45 Conversely, land that is held under an 'old style' Agricultural Holdings Act 1986 tenancy will give the producer long term security of tenure, but at the same time the permitted purposes to which land can be put will usually be limited to agricultural production. The Tenant Farmers Association has stressed the impact of short-term agreements on farmers' ability to participate in current agri-environment schemes, and on their impact on underinvestment. 46 If we are to develop an ambitious new policy grounded in PES, and that builds on the successes of current agri-environment schemes, then this issue needs to be addressed.
The creation of a stable property rights basis for a new PES scheme can be addressed in one of two ways: either by:
the introduction of a new type of tenancy structure for use where a long-term management scheme for providing public goods is to be introduced (for example an 'environmental land tenancy' of, say, 20 years fixed duration). This might have periodic break clauses allowing for review of the performance of targets for the provision of public goods -accommodating both a 'results'-based approach and/or a management prescription-driven approach. Or (ii) the retention of current tenancy structures with the use of contractually binding arrangements between landowner and tenant providing for a review of performance at periodic breaks -and with a commitment to renew or extend tenure upon the satisfactory delivery of public goods (again this could be measured either by delivery of land management obligations or by results 
(b) Legal Models for Multi-party Environmental Agreements
The implementation of landscape level management will require the use of collaborative arrangements that will need to be captured in a legal form that is both flexible enough to allow for changed targets and land management prescriptions, but also robust in making provision for the monitoring (and if necessary legal enforcement) of management prescriptions. AES such as Higher-level Stewardship and Countryside Stewardship are currently implemented using a contractual model -management agreements with public bodies (e.g. Natural England) typically for 10 years in duration with publicly funded payments for agreed management prescriptions.
This model suffers drawbacks as a mechanism for landscape level management of ecosystems: it is time-limited and (as noted above) it does not guarantee the retention of public goods that have been 'purchased' during the term of the agreement. And it operates at the level of the farm or producer, not at a landscape level. Landscape Enterprise Networks ('LENS') offer a wider frame of reference to develop landscape level environmental management -but implementing a programme of this kind will require a new legal framework to underpin performance, monitoring and (important in a longterm arrangement) dispute resolution. Similar challenges will arise from initiatives such as the Natural Infrastructure Scheme proposed by the National Trust and Green Alliance. 48 A new legal model will be required that can engage multiple producers and farmers in a collaborative agreement structure which delivers landscape level benefits. Options to clothe such an arrangement with legal enforceability might include the following: 
